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Some eighteen months after the first Greek rescue
(May 2010), there is little doubt that the multiple
attempts at crisis management in the eurozone have
failed to restore confidence. Indeed, following each
round of emergency measures agreed by the eurozone
summits, to date the situation has deteriorated (see
Figure 1 for the widening spreads, over the German
Bund, for sovereign borrowing in the eurozone). At
the time of writing, contagion had spread beyond
Spain and Italy to the core sovereigns, with France
close to losing its triple A-rating and even Germany
experiencing partial failure in a Bund auction on
23 November. Spreads are also opening up for
Austria, Belgium, Finland and even the virtuous
Netherlands. Meanwhile, the banking system across
Europe is under increasing strain, with term funding
all but closed for any bank with significant exposure
to distressed sovereign debtors and the interbank
market close to seizing up. Deposit withdrawals have
surfaced in a number of large banks from the periph-
ery. The euro has started to weaken in foreign
exchange markets, narrowing room for a distinction
between the eurozone debt crisis and the euro-curren-
cy crisis from which some observers drew comfort
until recently.
These developments once again raise fundamental
questions: what is not working? Why is it that dra-
matic changes in our policies and institutions within
the eurozone are failing to halt the meltdown of con-
fidence? Answers are needed, and fast, because the
breakdown of the eurozone now appears a concrete
possibility if we continue along this path. Rather than
dwelling on the details of specific interventions, this
essay concentrates on the fundamental questions and
disagreements before us. Essentially my argument is
that political disagreements, rather than any funda-
mental economic disturbance, are leading us down a
very slippery slope. 
Reform policies under way
One important strand of opinion, notably in
Germany and other northern European countries,
maintains that the culprits behind the present crisis
are lax fiscal policies and excessive debt accumulation
by some eurozone member states. Greece, for one, is
defaulting on its debt obligations, despite very harsh
corrective measures – although its plight has been
aggravated by its economy going into free fall as a
result and its political system coming under almost
unbearable strain in a bid to keep to the austerity
course. But the numbers are small and should not
endanger the solidity of Europe’s banking system,
even under extreme hypotheses of debt restructuring.
Ireland, Portugal and Spain have adopted or are
about to adopt public-sector consolidation measures
that have earned good marks from the European
Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Indeed their
sovereign interest rate spreads over the German Bund
were all receding – dramatically so for Ireland – up
until the latest round of meetings by the euro summit
at end-October (see Figure 1).
Last summer, sovereign selling pressures have expand-
ed into Italy, which has a relatively small public sector
deficit totalling about 4 percent of GDP in 2011, but
a debt-to-GDP ratio of almost 120 percent. The gov-
ernment tried to play for time, but heavy selling pres-
sures convinced it to bring forward budgetary balance
to 2013. The limelight of market concerns then shift-
ed to the adverse composition of the consolidation
measures, largely based on higher taxes, and the
absence of market opening and growth-enhancing
measures, which in turn raised doubts about the long-
term sustainability of the public debt stock, given
Italy’s endemic dismal growth and productivity per-
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formance. Since Berlusconi’s coalition was unwilling
or unable to take steps required, it was ousted from
government – once again under heavy selling pres-
sures, with the spread over the Bund climbing to close
to 600 basis points. The new ‘national unity’ Monti
government, sworn in at lightning speed, has to date
received broad parliamentary support for all measures
needed to restore sound government finances and
reform the Italian economy. The spread over the Bund
has dropped, but it remains near 500 basis points as
markets await the new government’s decisions.
Currency union has admittedly allowed, or even
encouraged, lax financial policies
– with Ger  many and France car-
rying large responsibilities, having
suspended in 2003 the excessive
deficit procedure that should have
been opened on themselves.
These policies subsequently came
to haunt all of us as financial
markets re-priced sovereign risks.
However, budgetary consolida-
tion seems well underway in all
‘sinning’ countries, together with
long-awaited structural reforms.
As shown by Figure 2, IMF fore-
casts to 2016 suggest that after
increasing in the aftermath of the
2008–09 financial and economic
crisis, sovereign debts are now
expected to stabilise at manage-
able ratios to GDP in all of the
eurozone countries except Greece,
even though slow growth will not
allow for rapid reductions. In
sum, all available information
points to a situation that is com-
ing back under control.
Stronger economic governance in
the eurozone
Meanwhile, economic gover-
nance in the eurozone has been
strengthened to unthinkable de  -
gree in terms of both substance
and enforcement procedures. The
Broad Economic Policy Guide  -
lines of Article 121 TFEU are
now assisted by legally binding
enforcement procedures, while
the European Semester ensures
ex-ante coordination of economic policies and time-
consistent decision-making processes in the member
states and the European Council. The excessive deficit
procedure has been reinforced in both its preventive
and corrective arm and now includes fresh constraints
on growth of public expenditures and operational cri-
teria for public debt reduction. There is also a new
procedure, also legally-binding and supported by
sanctions, for the correction of ‘excessive economic
imbalances’, explicitly targeting competitive imbal-
ances and their underlying causes. The Euro-Plus Pact










































































































































































































































































































































































10-YEAR GOVERNMENT BONDS SPREAD VS. GERMAN BUND











































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: [1] May 2010: Adoption of the first financial assistance package for Greece and estab-
lishment of the European Financial Stability Fund; [2] 18 October 2010: Deauville agreement
between France and Germany destabilises financial markets; [3] 24–25 March 2011: European
Council agrees on a new economic policy package; [4] 21 July 2011: Eurozone leaders reach an
agreement on a new rescue package for Greece and the EU crisis management framework; mar-
kets are reassured and sovereign spreads fall; [5] 26 October 2011: Eurozone governance
stepped up at the euro summit.
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member states to budgetary stability, structural
reforms and market opening. Eurozone members are
required to strengthen their budgetary frameworks
with the adoption of multi-year planning, top-down
decision-making procedures and independent evalua-
tion agencies. Many members have even indicated
their intention to introduce balance-budget rules into
their constitutions. 
The European Commission has been given indepen-
dent powers to signal emerging deviations from
agreed policy guidelines, and to make recommenda-
tions to the Council on the opening of formal proce-
dures, extending to the sanctions phase, which the
Council can only reject or weaken with ‘reverse’ qual-
ified majorities. A recently proposed regulation will
require eurozone member states to present their draft
budgets at the same time each year and, before nation-
al parliaments decide on them, give the Commission
sufficient time to assess them and, if need be, ask for
revisions when it considers that the draft budget vio-
lates the Stability and Growth Pact.
Some still consider these improvements insufficient
and would like even stronger safeguards against pol-
icy slippages, possibly including the attribution of
direct executive powers to eurozone bodies (to be
identified) to modify policies within national
domains. And yet, even leaving aside legitimate pre-
occupations regarding the progressive expropriation
of national sovereign powers – which at some stage
will clearly require the establishment of new legit-
imising controls at eurozone or Union level by
means of treaty changes – there is little doubt that
we now live in a different world where policy con-
straints on the member states of the eurozone are
effectively binding, which is also due to additional
coercion resulting from heightened financial markets
scrutiny.
However, far from abating, market pressure on the
eurozone still seems to be increasing. At the same time
this pressure does not seem to be affecting countries
with large deficits and rapidly rising debt outside of
the eurozone, like the United States and Britain, not
to mention Japan, which has mountainous public
debt, totalling almost 200 percent of GDP, but seems
to have no problems in placing its paper on the mar-
kets. Similarly, it is difficult, to understand why many
countries with a smaller debt/GDP ratio than
Germany within the eurozone like Austria, Finland or
the Netherlands, for example, must pay a positive
spread over the Bund on their government issues. 
In the end, one only arrive at the conclusion that the
eurozone suffers from some ‘special disease’ that
makes financial markets fret even if policies seem on
the right track everywhere. Of course, if this were
indeed the case and a special disease did exist, it is
also possible that the financial markets may be forc-
ing us onto a path of excessive deflation, which may
eventually frustrate all efforts at budgetary consoli-
dation – Greece docet.1 This warning raises the ques-
tion of the euro or, rather, the way we manage our
common currency.
The foreign currency syndrome
The fundamental difference between a country that is
a member of a monetary union and a country that
has its own currency is that the former needs the per-
mission of an institution that it does not control to
increase liquidity, say to compensate for an outflow
of liquidity through the banking system or to sta-
bilise the government bond market, for example,
while the latter does not. To each of the EMU mem-
bers, for all practical purposes, the euro is like a for-
eign currency, since no one enjoys access to the euro
printing press. As a consequence, eurozone member
states are exposed to currency runs that are triggered
when confidence in the ability to meet foreign-cur-
rency obligations is shaken by an exogenous shock or
by unconvincing policies. Such a system can switch
rapidly from ‘fair weather’, where foreign currency
risks are underpriced, to ‘bad weather’ where risks
become overpriced. In the second scenario, the explo-
sion of financing costs can make fears of a run self-
fulfilling.
Switching from ‘fair weather’ to ‘bad weather’ is not
an entirely unpredictable event. A further feature of
monetary union is that one monetary policy must fit
all – regardless of divergent prices and wages, produc-
tivity, public spending and taxation, and market
openness. When a country with higher inflation and
structural rigidities joins a monetary union, it typical-
ly finds itself awash with liquidity, since real interest
rates become negative and credit is cheap. Of course,
real exchange rates subsequently appreciate and busi-
ness competitiveness suffers, leading to rising unem-
ployment; but abundant credit encourages the coun-
try to postpone adjustment and preserve inefficient
jobs with public money. Public spending rises as a
result and the public-sector deficit widens, while
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politicians will thrive on distributing subsidies and
protection to broaden electoral consensus.
Lax financing conditions may prevail for quite a long
time, as financial markets continue lending to diver-
gent countries to gain higher nominal returns. Sooner
or later, however, the process is bound to come to a
halt, as growing external and public-sector deficits
come to be seen as unsustainable. Then one day, typi-
cally as a consequence of some exogenous shock,
investors flee, liquidity evaporates and the divergent
country finds itself unable to refinance its debts in pri-
vate markets at acceptable prices, as was the case with
Greece and Portugal. 
A variant of the model is one whereby the economy in
the divergent country experiences a real-estate boom
and rapid economic expansion, leading to unsustain-
able private indebtedness, while the public sector
seems in good health. Here again, however, the real-
estate boom must end at some time, and, when house
prices start falling, many of those private debts can-
not be serviced, to the point where financing institu-
tions are threatened with insolvency. In such cases the
government may feel obliged to step in and rescue the
banks, turning unsustainable private debt into dan-
gerously high government debt, as happened to
Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Spain.
Thus, lax and divergent national policies do carry
responsibility for the sudden switch in confidence.
However, financial markets do not tend to adjust
smoothly, but rather by jumps, and they tend to over-
shoot. Even countries that did not run divergent poli-
cies or, at any rate, maintained manageable exposures
in ‘fair weather’, may find themselves unable to man-
age them after the shift to ‘bad weather’.
These events lead to a reassessment of outstanding
risks for the entire union, with an extra ingredient:
namely, the fact that national banking systems have in
the meantime become highly interconnected – with
‘core’ country banks extending excessive credit to
divergent country banks and governments. Thus any
doubts regarding the sustainability of sovereign oblig-
ations in divergent countries are readily transformed
into doubts over the sustainability of the banking sys-
tem in the core, stable countries. 
Confidence in financial markets is a fickle commodi-
ty that can evaporate quite rapidly unless investors
can be reassured that a liquidity crisis will not be
allowed to develop into a solvency crisis that spreads
from one member of the monetary union to another.
This is precisely what has happened in the eurozone
since Greece was first bailed out in May 2010.
Liquidity support and debt restructuring
A confidence crisis spreading contagion even to the
‘sound’ part of a monetary union can be stopped by
an abundant supply of liquidity from the central bank
or by a common fund performing the same service but
incorporating policy conditionality, with resources
lent by the central bank or raised in the capital mar-
kets. In all likelihood, a suitable combination of both
is currently needed. Failure by the euro summit to
agree on a strong and effective rescue fund has stiff-
ened the ECB, which fears that losses on its holdings
of distressed sovereigns may one day force it to turn
to national governments for capital, and thus lose its
independence.
However, two stumbling blocks have so far impeded
adequate liquidity support. The first impediment is
the fear that liquidity will reduce pressure on ‘sinners’
to adjust. All assertions that the sinners are now
mending their ways, under much strengthened com-
mon economic governance arrangements, have so far
failed to convince the capital markets – even if, as I
mentioned, policies have turned in the right direction
everywhere. Some will not be satisfied until the union
is assigned direct powers to intervene and change
national policies whenever these deviate from their
policy commitments. However, everyone should be
aware that even the best policy course will need time
to produce its effects; in the meantime, adequate
financing flows must be maintained, or adjustment
policies will fail to prevent a currency run.
The second ingredient in the unfolding drama is the
intermingling of liquidity support and fiscal transfers,
which inevitably arises if some of the countries under
life support become insolvent and thus require debt
restructuring. In this regard, Germany is adamant
that liquidity support can never entail fiscal transfers
– which would breach the ‘no bail-out’ provision of
the Treaty (e.g. Article 125 TFEU) – and has on this
account maintained strong pressure on the ECB to
limit its open market operations in support of dis-
tressed sovereigns. 
In reality, if adjustment works, there is no reason why
liquidity support should be turned into fiscal trans-
fers. To the extent that confidence is hit by fears ofCESifo Forum 4/2011 17
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insufficient liquidity, the simple act of restoring ade-
quate liquidity would stop the run and make insol-
vency, and the need for fiscal transfers, unlikely. On
the other hand, if there is a collapse of liquidity, fiscal
transfers may become inevitable at least to rescue own
(German) banks, following the chain-collapse of all
other sovereign debtors in the union.
Germany has also insisted that the private sector
should share the burdens of any debt restructuring.
As a result of disastrous communications, private sec-
tor involvement (PSI) has become a promise of losses
on all outstanding eurozone sovereign exposures,
without sufficient differentiation. Thus investors have
started to shy away from most eurozone sovereigns;
even Germany has been affected. A cursory look at
Figure 1 will confirm that contagion really started fol-
lowing the Franco-German announcement in
Deauville in October 2010 that PSI would be part of
any financial assistance programme.
Two further jumps in the spreads are clearly associat-
ed with the July and October 2011 meetings of the
euro summit, as the announcements of rising ‘hair-
cuts’ on Greek debt combined with inadequate liquid-
ity support for the other distressed debtors succeeded
in convincing investors to get rid of eurozone sover-
eigns as rapidly as possible.
Conclusion 
The eurozone has proven collectively unable to ring-
fence the Greek problem to date and to raise credible
liquidity walls around the other distressed sovereigns.
Meanwhile, the costs of adjustment in divergent
countries are ballooning thanks to rising interest rates
and falling activity, heralding further budgetary cuts
and further deflation. The euro summit has to go
back to the drawing board and overcome its political
disagreements on how to proceed. Straitening policies
in all the member states will not suffice; there is also a
need for an adequate provision of liquidity – as large
as needed to stop the on-going currency run. If this
cannot be agreed upon, the eurozone will break up,
creating gigantic economic dislocations as a result.